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ABSTRACT
The standard race-to-the-bottom result is curious in one respect. If a nation wants
to attract foreign capital, providing the optimal level of public amenities (and thus
charging the optimal tax rate) would seem optimal. This conjecture fails in the
standard tax competition model since foreign capital ignores host nation
amenities. While this assumption is reasonable for physical capital, other forms of
capital (human capital) tends to move with its owner, so amenities matter. We
show that when factors move with their owners, symmetric international tax
competition may leads to the socially optimal rate. This result can be thought of
as a corollary of the Tiebout efficiency hypothesis.
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1.INTRODUCTION
At one level, the result that tax competition leads to an under provision of public
goods is somewhat curious. If a nation wants to attract foreign capital, providing the optimal
level of public amenities (and thus charging the optimal tax rate) would seem to be a good
place to start. In the tax competition literature in general, this conjecture is wrong since
foreign capital does not benefit from the host nation’s amenities; capital is assumed to spend
its income in its home nation regardless of where it is employed. This may seem reasonable
and relevant when speaking about physical capital – it is quite easy for physical capital
owners to be physically separated from their capital. However for many other forms of
capital, especially human capital, it is not easy to employ the factor without its owner being
present physically. The same can be said for most forms of labour services.
The importance of this point lies in the fact that assuming that capital owners move
together with their capital produces a stark result. When factors move with their owners,
international tax competition may lead to the socially optimal tax rate. In other words, tax
competition may be harmless. In particular, when all factor owners share the same tastes and
governments maximise national welfare, the Nash equilibrium tax rate is the first-best rate.
This is certainly not a new result to public economics – it is basically a corollary of the
famous Tiebout efficiency hypothesis
1 – but it does highlight the sort of assumptions that are
necessary to generate harmful tax competition.
∗ Forslid gratefully acknowledges financial support from The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary
Foundation.
1 Tiebout (1956) mainly concerns sorting of consumers by their preferences for public goods, but he also asserts
that “On the production side it is assumed that communities are forces to keep production costs at a minimum2 2
To illustrate the importance of the nature of capital, fix ideas and introduce notation in
a familiar setting, the paper first quickly reviews the standard race-to-the-bottom result. Then
we show that when capital is human capital, the tax competition is harmless in the sense that
the equilibrium tax rate in a Nash tax game is the same with and without capital mobility. The
final section presents our concluding comments.
2.HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION:P HYSICAL
CAPITAL
We first briefly review the major contributions to this literature and then – to fix ideas
fix ideas and notation – we briefly re-derive the well-known race to the bottom result. This
provides a benchmark for the subsequent section that shows the result may be reversed for
human capital.
The Standard Tax Competition Literature
The modern literature on tax competition (see Wilson 1999 for a recent survey)
focuses on capital that is ‘disembodied’ in the sense that capital can work in one location
while its owner spends its reward in another region; physical capital and knowledge capital
are common forms of disembodied capital. The central result here is that international tax
competition for a mobile tax base leads to sub-optimally low taxes and under-provision of
public goods. This was pointed out in the context of mobile capital by Oates (1972), and
formalised by e.g. Gordon (1983), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), and
Wildasin (1988), with subsequent important contributions from de Crombrugghe and Tulkens
(1990), Bucovetsky (1991), Wilson (1991), Wildasin (1991), and Kanbur and Keen (1993). A
major proviso to the sub-optimal-taxation result is the so-called Leviathan government
hypothesis, which asserts that self-interested policy makers tend to set taxes too high, so the
race-to-the-bottom thus may actually yield a second best improvement (see Edwards and
Keen 1996).
The sub-optimal taxation stems from the negative externality that arises when
jurisdictions non-cooperatively select tax rates, in part to attract a mobile tax base from
another jurisdictions. Perhaps most obvious externality of a tax change on factors that are
mobile is the effect on other regions’ budgets, what Wildasin (1989) has labelled the “fiscal
externality”. A second type of externality is that the tax policy in a large region may affect
factor returns in another region. This type of “pecuniary externality” has been analysed by
Bucovetsky (1991), de Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990), Wilson (1991) and Wildasin
(1988,1991). A result in this setting is that there is a “small country advantage”. When a large
country lower its tax on capital there is a large increase in the demand for capital and
consequently a large fall in the return of capital. A small country, on the contrary, can lower
its capital taxes without much negative effect on the after tax return to capital. Finally, some
studies have analysed tax competition in a setting where imperfect competition is the driving
externality. For example, Janeba (1998) adds tax competition into a strategic trade model. In
this setting taxes are competed down to zero.
either through the efficiency of city managers or through competition from other communities. (p. 422 emphasis
added)”3 3
2.1.1 The Basic Model
Our version of the ‘standard tax competition model’ (STCM) involves two nations,
which we call home and the rest of the world, and two factors of production, which we call
capital K and labour L.
2 Each Walrasian (perfect competition and constant returns) economy
produces the same, homogenous private good using these two factors. This good is traded
costlessly, so international prices are equalised; factor prices are not equalised since there are
more factors than goods. Capital is viewed as physical capital in that it can move
internationally without its owner, and indeed, labourers are assumed to be perfectly
immobile.
The sole role of government in the model is to set the tax rate, and collect tax revenue
that it turns costlessly into a public good. Capital and labour are taxed in the nation in which
they are employed (origin principle). For simplicity, the tax rate on labour and capital are
identical. Technology for home and rest of world is given by the standard neoclassical
production function:
(1) K L LL KK KL K L KF LF Y F F F F F L K F Y + = > > = , , 0 , , ]; , [
where subscripts indicate partials, as usual. The restrictions on the partial derivatives impose
constant returns and diminishing marginal products.
3 For convenience the good’s price is
normalised to unity everywhere.
Consumers, who own either labour or capital, have the same preference, which, to be
concrete, we assume are given by the simple, explicit function:
(2)
γ γ − =
1 C G U
where G is a public good (this is provided only by government) and C is consumption of the
good, and the Cobb-Douglas parameter γ measures the strength of preferences for the public
good. Rest-of-world consumers have identical tastes. We assume that U is homogenous of
degree one.
2.1.2 Capital Mobility and Taxation
Capital is assumed to be either perfectly mobile, or perfectly immobile. When capital
is mobile, the amount of capital working in a nation may differ from the amount of capital
owned by a nation, so we need separate notations for these to concepts. We use ‘n’ and ‘n*’to
indicate the amount of the mobile factor that is employed in home and in the rest of the
world, respectively, while K and K* indicate the amount of capital that each nation owns.
The national capital endowments are fixed, so we can without further loss of generality
choose units such that the world’s fixed capital stock K
w is normalised to unity i.e.
n+n*=K
w=1.
The spatial allocation of capital is determined by the equalisation of post-tax rates of
return when capital is perfectly mobile. When capital is assumed to be perfectly immobile,
the spatial allocation is fixed by endowments. Since factors are paid their marginal products,
we can write the location conditions as:
2 Some versions of the STCM assume infinitely many small nations, but we can mimic this by assuming home
acts as if it were small in the sense that its tax policy has no impact on the post-tax reward to capital.
3 To ensure interior equilibria (all regions have some capital), we could assume that the marginal product of
capital becomes infinite as the capital labour ratio goes to zero.4 4
(3)
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where ‘t’ and L are home’s tax rate and labour force, while t* and L* are the corresponding
variables for rest-of-world; π and π* are the rewards to capital in home and the rest of the
world, respectively.
2.1.3 Government’s Problem and the Social FOC
The two governments play Nash in tax rates, so taking the rest-of-world tax rate as
given, the home government’s problem is to choose the tax rate, t, to maximise welfare of the
representative consumer subject to (3) and a balanced budget requirement, i.e.:
(4) I t C tY G where C G U t ) 1 ( , ], , [ max − = =
where Y=F[n,L] is GDP, i.e. the home tax base, and (1-t)I is home after-tax GNP.
4 Also, G is
a public good (this is provided only by government), and we have assumed that the cost of G
is unity, so home’s provision of the public good just equals home’s tax revenue.
5 Also, since
factors are paid their marginal product, home GNP is:
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The government’s first order condition is:
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Here the left-hand side of the first expression is the marginal rate of substitution between
private and public goods, i.e. the social benefit of higher tax revenue. On the right-hand side
(RHS) of the second expression, η>0 is the capital-output elasticity and dn/dt is the
responsiveness of capital to northern taxes, taking the southern tax rate as given.
6
Totally differentiating the location condition, (3), we find:
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Here the FKK terms are negative; these show how fast capital’s marginal product declines as
capital employment rises.
4 Since some home capital may be working in the rest of the world, it might seem like we should have separate
terms for K working in the two nations. However, the location condition (top expression in (3)) ensures that (1-
t)FK=(1-t*)F
*
K,s ow ec a nw r i t e( 1 - t ) Ias if all northern capital earned FK and paid t.
5 Taxes are collected in the numeraire good Y and thus the assumed production function for G is G=F[K,L]
where K and L are hired by the government using the collected Y.
6 Note that dC/dt=-I+(dI/dn)(dn/dt), but by the envelope theorem dI/dn=0 – basically since there is no distortion
between K and L employment, a tax change that induces a small increase in capital employment raises output
(GDP) by FK, but since the extra capital must be paid FK, there is no change in domestic income (GNP). Note
that in many formulations of the STCM only capital is taxed; since the K/L choice is distorted in this case, a tax
change that induces extra capital employment does affect national income.5 5
To solve the game we would specify the rest-of-world first order condition and then
use the two conditions to solve for the two tax rates, but we can illustrate the main results
without doing so.
2.2. Symmetric Nation Nash Tax Competition
The left-hand side of the first expression in (6) is the ratio of the marginal social
benefit of taxation to the marginal social cost of taxation; the second order conditions of the
government’s problem ensure that it is downward sloped at the optimum. When capital is
immobile, the right-hand side (RHS) of (6) equals unity, so the tax rate is chosen optimally in
the sense that the marginal social benefit of taxation, UG, just equals the marginal social cost,
-UC (note that I=Y when n=K). Thus without capital mobility the social first best is achieved
and the equilibrium tax rate is t
S. When capital is mobile the tax rate affects the tax base (i.e.
dn/dt<0), so the RHS exceeds unity and this results in a tax rate, t’, that is too low. To
summarise, we write:
Result 1 (race to the bottom): The mobility of disembodied capital results in a tax
rate that is too low from the social perspective. In this sense, tax competition is
harmful.
3.HARMLESS TAX COMPETITION:H UMAN
CAPITAL
We now turn to showing that the race-to-the-bottom result is reversed when capital is
not disembodied, i.e. when capital and its owner move together as in the case of human
capital. To be concrete, we refer to internationally mobile human capital as entrepreneurs.
All assumptions from above are maintained except we now suppose that capital
owners must move when capital moves. The preferences of capital owners is identical to that
of labourers and the government.
3.1. Nash Competition for Entrepreneurs
The most direct method of establishing that tax competition is harmless when the
mobile factor is human capital is to assert that the first-best tax rate is an equilibrium, and
then to show that no nation would deviate from this equilibrium.
3.1.1 Deviation Argument
We wish to establish that t=t*=t
S is a Nash equilibrium of the tax game. To do this,
we ask whether home could improve its payoff by varying its tax rate slightly when the
amount of capital in the home nation, i.e. ‘n’, can vary in response to tax differentials.
Starting off at t=t*=t
S, any deviation will, by definition of the optimal tax rate, decrease
utility of capital-owners in the region. This would result in out-migration of entrepreneurs
until utility were re-equalised in the two regions. The resulting loss of human capital would
lower the utility of the remaining home residents, so this deviation would not raise the payoff
of home government. Consequently, the home government would not deviate from t=t*=t
S.
By symmetry, the rest of world government would also not find it optimal to deviate and so
would not deviate. This establishes that t=t*=t
S is a Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium can also be established more mechanically.6 6
3.1.2 Direct Argument
First note that when capital owners move with their capital, GNP and GDP are always
identical (i.e. I≡Y). Moreover, C and G are implicit functions of n and t, since:
(8) ] , [ , ) 1 ( , L n F Y Y t C tY G = − = =
Finally, since we have normalised preferences to be homogenous of degree one in G and C,
the government’s objective function can be written as:
(9)
γ γ − − ≡ =
1 ) 1 ( ] [ , ] [ t t t f where Y t f U
and we note that at the first best (i.e. when human capital is immobile):
(10) () 0 ] [ = Y t f
S
t
so we know that ft=0 at the first best tax rate.
Now allowing human capital to move, we differentiate (9), using (8), to get the
government’s first order condition. We evaluate it at our hypothesised equilibrium t=t*=t
S:
(11) () () 0 ] [ ] [ = + t n
S S
t n Y t f Y t f
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives as usual. Since this is evaluated at the social
first-best, i.e. t=t*=t
S, we know from (10) that the first term sum is zero, but the remaining
term only equals zero if nt=0. In other words, our hypothesised equilibrium is indeed Nash,
only if a marginal change in t, holding t* constant, will result in no capital movement. We
turn now to evaluating this derivative.
The expression that determines the location of entrepreneurs (human capital) differs
from the location condition for physical capital since entrepreneurs care about the provision
of public goods as well as the tax rate when making their location decisions. In particular, the
condition involves an equalisation of utility levels for capital owners, thus:
(12)
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where the C
k’s are the consumption of capital owners. Note that we can write
U[G,C
k]=f[t]Y
γπ
1-γ since the income of home-based entrepreneurs is π and G=tY; the
expression for C
K* is isomorphic. To find nt when capital is mobile, we totally differentiate
the top expression in (12) to get:
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a n dt h e nc o l l e c tt e r m si n’ d n ’a n d’ d t ’ ;n t is the ratio of the coefficients on ’dn’ and ’dt’,
where all the partials are evaluated at our hypothesised equilibrium values for the tax rates.
By the definition of t
S, the first term in (13) is zero. This means that the coefficient on
’dt’ is zero, so given that (13) holds, the coefficent on ’dn’ must also be zero, i.e. dn/dt must
also be zero. This confirms that small changes in the home tax rate, starting from the first-
best tax rate, has no marginal effect on the location of capital.
Intuition for this seemingly remarkable result is quite straightforward. It relies on the
fact that the mobile factor and the government share the same tastes over the tax rate. At the
social first-best tax rate, we know that marginal changes in the tax rate have no impact on the7 7
value of the objective function; the ’hilltop’ is flat. Thus a small change in t, also implies no
change in U. With no change in U, we know the U=U* at the initial geographical division of
capital, so the small change produces no capital migration. To summarise, we write:
Result 2 (Tiebout efficiency and nature of capital): When the mobile factor
owners move with their factor, and these owners have the same tastes as the
owners of immobile factors, and governments have Benthamite objectives, Nash
tax competition over the mobile factor will result in the first-best tax rate being
set. In this sense, tax competition is harmless.
As taxes are used to provide public goods and the mobile factors care about local provision of
public goods, the mobile factor acts as if they like taxes – at least up to a point. Since mobile
and immobile factors have identical preferences, the tax rate that is most attractive to the
mobile factor is also the tax rate most preferred by the immobile factor, so the government’s
attempt to attract the mobile factor ends up maximising social welfare.
Comments on the Result
This result is certainly not a proof that tax competition is harmless. It is a theoretical
landmark, or example, that helps us understand exactly what is driving the standard race-to-
the-bottom result. In particular, it tells us is that if tax competition is to be harmful then it is
necessary to drive a wedge between the government’s preferences over taxes and the mobile
factor’s preferences over taxes.
4.GENERALITY OF THE HARMLESS TAX
COMPETITION RESULT
Here we show that the result does not hold for all preferences when G is taken to be a
public good.
When we have general preferences, namely, U=U[G,C] and G is a public good so that
each home citizen consumes G=tY, then the government’s first order condition is:
(14) () ( ) 0 ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( , [ ] ) 1 ( , [ = − + − − + + − t n c t n G n Y t Y Y t tY U n tY Y Y t tY U
instead of (11), and at the first best (no capital mobility case, the tax rate is such that (UG-
UC)Y=0, where the partials are evaluated at G=tY and C=(1-t)Y. As above, the Nash
equilibrium t’s that satisfy that (14) is the same as the first best only if nt= 0 .B u tn o w ,t h e
utility of capital is U[tY,(1-t)π], so total differentiation of the location condition, i.e. the top
expression in (12), is:
(15) () ( ) 0 ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( , [ ] ) 1 ( , [ = − + − − + + − dn t dt t tY U dn tY Ydt t tY U n c n G π π π π
instead of (13). Now because the partials are evaluated at different points, namely C
k versus
C as in (14), dn/dt is not necessarily zero.
However, when preferences are separable between ’t’ and income, we get the
harmless result. The point is easily seen. Separability means that the government’s objective
function is f[t]Y and capital owners’ objectives are f[t]h[π,Y].
7 Since at the first-best ’t’ we
7 The capital-owners’ preferences involve Y since G=tY and π since C=(1-t)π.8 8
always have ft[t
S]=0, total differentiation of the location conditition will always imply
dn/dt=0. To see this, note that the total derivative would be:
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Because the first term is zero, and the partials of h are not zero, dn must also be zero.
5.CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper shows that when capital moves with its owner, international tax
competition for mobile capital may produce socially optimal taxation. This certainly does not
prove that tax competition is harmless; rather it is an example that helps clarify exactly what
is driving the standard race-to-the-bottom result. In particular, it tells us is that if tax
competition is to be harmful then it is necessary to drive a wedge between the government’s
preferences over taxes and the mobile factor’s preferences over taxes. This wedge always
exists when capital earnings are repatriated since capital seeks its highest post-tax reward
without concern for amenities. However, when capital-owners move with their capital, they
do care about the positive aspects of taxation. If they and the government are in agreement
over the pros and cons of taxes, then competition for footloose capital-owners will not
necessary lead to inefficient tax cutting. Indeed, there is some presumption that regions
would strive to offer the preferred point on the tax/amenities trade-off.
Importantly, this result has implications for empirical work. Our result suggests that
researchers should be careful to distinguish between taxes that affect disembodied capital and
taxes that affect human capital when testing the implications of the standard tax competition
model.
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